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CHAPTER I 
THE TRADITIONAL ALLIANCE UNDER ANALYSIS 
Most observers considered the Atlanta elections of 1969 a turning 
point in the city's political history. A new coalition of voters emerged, 
predominantly black, which elected the mayor, the vice-mayor, and several 
members of the aldermanic and school boards. Until this election, Atlan¬ 
ta's mayors "had been chosen by a coalition composed of virtually all 
black voters, most of the middle and upper-middle class northside whites, 
and a minority of whites elesewhere." But in 1969 most whites from all 
parts of the city, and the city's "power structure," supported the losing 
mayoralty candidate. Black voters, unwilling to support the establish¬ 
ment choice, found that they could greatly influence the choice of the 
new city officials.^ 
The voting pattern to which Mr. Charles Rooks referred indicated 
a period of transition in the traditional political alliances of the 
city. This transition resulted partly from the impact of many events, 
local, national and international, which sensitized and awakened the 
black voter's view of himself and the issues. At the same time, there 
was a wider selection of candidates to choose from as well as an increase 
^Charles S. Rooks, The Atlanta Elections of 1969 (Atlanta, Ga.: 
The Voter Education Project, Inc., 1970), pp. 1-3. 
1 
2 
in the number of blacks living in the city. These factors were prob¬ 
ably not, in 1969, powerful enough to elect a black mayor, but they 
were sufficient to break up a coalition, which for the past twenty-one 
years, had become an institutionalized system for electing city offi¬ 
cials. In order to understand the profound changes which occurred in 
this election, it is necessary to review the nature of this coalition 
between the black community and the white power structure which for so 
long dominated the politics of Atlanta. Floyd Hunter, in 1953» defined 
the power structure as a small "ruling elite" or "power elite" made up 
of forty influential drawn largely from the business world. Through 
cliques and crowds they formulated policy which, on community wide issues, 
was then channeled by a "fluid committee structure" down to institutional, 
2 
associational groupings which then executed the policy. 
Hunter viewed the Atlanta Negro community as a sub-structure of 
power as well as a sub-community. As a community grouping it called up 
many issues which tended to mobilize the total power structure. The top 
policy makers in the black community were mainly from the professional 
rather than the business world, and had a political context that the domi¬ 
nant power elites lacked. It was estimated, for example, that one of 
the leading black influential could, with the backing of his organization, 
swing 50,000 votes in a state election. But, even with this kind of power, 
the sub-community leaders never rated inclusion on the white upper policy 
strategy committees. Instead, they were approached informally for their 
2F1oyd Hunter, Community Power Structure (Chapel Hill, N. C.t 
University of North Carolina Press, 1953)» 
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opinions and support. Thus, with no free flow of information between 
them, the Negro leaders' evaluation of important issues did not corres¬ 
pond to that of the white leaders. Rather, the Negro demands compared 
more closely with a list provided by such persons in the white profes¬ 
sional understructure as social scientists and social workers. Hunter 
thus drew the conclusion that there was little overt awareness on the 
part of the white leaders regarding the concerns of the blacks. He 
did point out, however, that there was a growing recognition on the 
part of the power elite that more exchange between the two communities 
was becoming necessary.^ 
Eight years later, in a study entitled Community Influential. 
M. K. Jennings revised Hunter's basic model. Jennings rejected the 
notion of a power elite and viewed the power structure as “a number of 
slightly to moderately competitive coalitions, not dominated by economic 
notables" which exercised "determinate influence in their own policy 
areas." He saw the growth of the federal government's role as partly 
responsible for the newer structure. As the federal government became 
involved in urban renewal, highway construction, housing, and other 
areas important to Atlanta's economic and political life, government 
officials assumed the role of influential specialists and helped to 
fragment the distribution of power. Thus influential were no longer 
restricted to the perceived elite, and a more pluralistic power struc¬ 
ture emerged. Elective and appointed government officials, lay, pro¬ 
fessional, civic, and minority group leaders, especially Negro, all had 
4 
I. 
a say in who ruled and what was decided in Atlanta. 
Hunter and Jennings agreed that the Atlanta Negro Voters League 
was tremendously influential in transferring bloc votes to candidates. 
In city elections the organization maintained a block by block organiza¬ 
tion in Negro precincts and interviewed all prospective candidates. 
Before election day they endorsed a slate which was passed around on 
election morning. Their "batting average, particularly in Atlanta's 
mayorality contests" was high, and Jennings viewed the organization as 
the most "important political club" in the city.** 
Edward C. Banfield's structure, described one year after Jennings', 
essentially agreed with the latter's model. Banfield viewed Atlanta as 
being governed "by politicians with the help of the press and an alli¬ 
ance between two voting blocs—one of businessmen and middle class 
whites" who were "interested in good government and civic progress," and 
the other of Negroes who aimed to "free themselves of the disabilities" 
that had held them down for so long. Banfield did acknowledge an infor¬ 
mal business-led "power structure" which was important in the city's 
affairs, but felt that often their powers were exaggerated. He con¬ 
cluded that the city was run by voters and politicians, not by a "power 
elite."6 
Based on this model, Banfield found that the mayoralty candidate 
Si. Kent Jennings, Community Influentials (New York: The Free 
Press of Glencoe, 1964), pp. 156-160. 
^Ibid., p. 67. 
6Edward C. Banfield, Big City Politics (New York: Random House, 
1965), pp. 18-30. 
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with the solid support of the business-led middle class and the Negro was 
unbeatable. In I960 Negroes constituted 38 per cent of the city's popu¬ 
lation. Banfield thus felt that this coalition effort was necessary 
because neither the middle class nor the Negroes could elect a man who 
would be "theirs and theirs alone."7 
In his study he perceived the mayor's power as a three-legged stool, 
consisting of the press, the business "power structure" and the Negro com¬ 
munity. It was Mayor Hartsfield, in his 23 years in office, who brought 
these three legs together into a solid working unit. When Mayor Hartsfield 
decided not to run in 1961, the business-led coalition was already pre¬ 
pared to put Ivan Allen into office. In order to get the support of the 
Negro vote, he relied heavily on the Negro Voters League. Since they 
were accustomed to bloc voting for the least objectionable candidate and 
since Allen's main opponent was as an arch segregationist, the League 
"had no real alternative but to support him."® 
The future of the Negro and business-led middle class voting alli¬ 
ance depended on two main factors, according to Banfield. The first 
factor was the number of blacks and middle class whites who were in the 
electorate and turned out to vote and the second was to what extent each 
group voted as a bloc. If each group continued to vote as a bloc, they 
would likely vote for the same person.^ 
In the Atlanta elections of 1969, the Hunter, Jennings, Banfield 
7Ibid., pp. 15-19. 
8Ibid.. p. 26. 
g 
Ibid., p. 30. 
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description of the Negro and white business-led middle class voting alli¬ 
ance broke down, and a new coalition emerged, predominantly black which 
elected the city's officials. The reasons for this breakdown will be 
analyzed for years to come, but some trends indicative of change can be 
defined. First, it is obvious that in the 1969 election the black com¬ 
munity had more candidates to choose from than ever before. Traditionally 
there had been a choice between the favorite candidate of the northside 
whites or "another candidate whose racial views made him anathema." For 
the first time there was a black candidate as well as a white, both with 
extremely liberal reputations. This choice in conjunction with the growth 
in black voting strength within the city and a greater voter turnout than 
whites in the mayoralty election, proved effective.^ 
In addition to these specifically local factors, there were others 
of a broader scope which came into play. Although vaguer and perhaps more 
abstract, there were none the less somewhat influential. After Martin 
Luther King, the Mississippi student movement and the elections of Mayors 
Stokes, Hatcher and Evers, the black's view of himself was permanently 
changed. These events of the fifties and sixties, with their sensitizing 
and awakening effect, provided some with an ideological position defined 
by the "Black Power" movement. Its basic precepts of black self develop¬ 
ment, self realization and self fulfillment were in tune with the thinking 
of most blacks in America. The movement attempted to develop a sense of 
"peoplehood" which emphasized pride rather than shame in blackness.^ 
^®Rooks, The Atlanta Elections, pp. 1-5. 
^Stokely Carmichael, Charles V. Hamilton, Black Power (New York: 
Random House, 1967), Introd. viii. 
7 
This pride would then give rise to the sense of group solidarity neces¬ 
sary for an effective bargaining position in a pluralistic society.^2 
In their book, Black Power. Stokely Carmichael and Charles V. 
Hamilton discussed Banfield's coalition model which had operated so suc¬ 
cessfully in Atlanta's political history. They agreed with Banfield that 
the black establishment, no matter how strong, was still insecure when 
compared with the strength of the white establishment represented by the 
Chamber of Commerce, Central Atlanta Association, and the Uptown Associ¬ 
ation.^ Therefore, they challenged the notion that a political and 
economically insecure group could fruitfully collaborate with a politi¬ 
cally and economically secure group. Because these collaborations won 
nothing for the blacks, they were obviously not in their best interests. 
Often the black leaders in Atlanta made such alliances, they felt, only 
to protect their own vested interests and their supposed influenced in 
the white power structure. And often the whites entered into such alli- 
14 ances in order to impede any progress which could take place. 
Mayor Ivan Allen in Mayor: Notes on the Sixties, shed some light 
on the dawning awareness that the alliance between blacks and northside 
whites would be broken in 1969.^ He stated that "almost immediately 
there were indications that times had changed; that this Atlanta mayoralty 
election was going to be like no other in the history of the city." After 
12Ibid.. p. 44. 
'^Banfield, Big City Politics, pp. 31-32. 
14 
Carmichael and Hamilton, Black Power, pp. 66-72. 
^Ivan Allen, Jr., Mayor:_Notes on the Sixties (New York: Simon 
and Schuster, 1971). 
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announcing that he would not seek re-election, Allen was visited by lead¬ 
ing representatives of the black community, including Dr. Martin Luther 
King, Sr., Jesse Hill, the Reverend Sam Williams and Senator Leroy 
Johnson. Allen believed that their visit was to affirm “their interest 
in continuing the traditional alliance between the white civic-and- 
business leadership and the black community." Allen was asked to serve 
as liaison man between the two groups so that a "satisfactory candidate 
for mayor could be found. This was perfectly proper — the logical, 
traditional way to go about it."^ 
A week later, however, the delegation revisited Allen and to his 
"shock," flatly refused Rodney Cook, a moderate white Republican, who 
was the business community's choice. Allen felt that personal reasons, 
unknown to him, were the cause of the refusal in conjunction with Tom 
Bradley's unsuccessful, but encouraging, bid for mayor in Los Angeles in 
the same year. Also, he knew that the delegation was well aware that the 
proportion of blacks had increased among the city's registered voters 
from twenty-nine per cent to nearly forty-one per cent since the last 
election. The heretofore "silent partner," the Negro voting bloc in the 
old alliance, thus became in 1969, an extremely articulate force.^ 
Analysis of the voting returns in the 1969 elections, clearly indi¬ 
cated ways in which the traditional collaboration collapsed. The voting 
in both the initial election held on October 7 and the runoff election 
16 Ibid., pp. 220-221. 
9 
held October 21 revealed a changing pattern, the complexity of which was 
most pronounced in the initial election. At that time there were four 
major candidates running, one of whom was black. The near unanimity of 
the black vote in the runoff belied the close split between Horace Tate, 
the black candidate and Sam Massell, the liberal white in the October 7 
1 . . 18 
election. 
The black voter's attention was focused on the two men whom they 
felt would be most helpful to the black community. In the October 7 
election, they gave Horace Tate 20,096 votes and Sam Massell 17»152 votes. 
They clearly ignored Rodney Cook who was the business community's choice. 
It was estimated that between 40,000 to 45,000 blacks voted in this elec- 
19 
tion and Cook only received 2,126 of these votes. Even after Dr. Tate 
was eliminated, the black voters only increased their support of Cook to 
3,784 votes in the October 21 runoff. The black voters were thus essen¬ 
tially unconcerned with him and Cook was never able to gain inroads into 
this voting bloc. 
Because Dr. Tate received only fifty per cent of the black vote and 
less than two per cent of the white vote, he did not make the runoff. 
And although he officially endorsed Rodney Cook for mayor in the race 
between Cook and Massell, he was unable to sway his supporters in this 
direction. Of the 49,528 total Negro votes cast, Massell received 
45,744 of them which represented 92.2 per cent of the black community's 
support.20 
l^Rooks, The Atlanta Elections, p. 6. 
^Clarence Bacote, personal computation of election returns for the 
October 7 election. 
10 
The majority of the white voting pattern was totally unlike that of 
the black voters. Tate, who was chosen by half the black voters in the 
initial election only received 2 per cent of the white vote. And Massell, 
who received a good percentage of the black vote received only 21.6 per 
cent of the white vote, with the majority of 44.8 per cent going to Cook.2^ 
The northside whites followed this trend more than other white groups. 
This group, who had formerly represented the business led side of the old 
alliance, supported Cook with 52.2 per cent of their votes, while Massell 
and another candidate, E. Millican, each received slightly less than half 
this number of votes. Overall, Massell ran third of the three white 
22 candidates among all white groups. 
While Massell picked up some white votes in the runoff, they only 
represented an increase from 21.6 per cent to 27 per cent. Cook, however, 
jumped from 44.8 per cent to 73 per cent. But without the black vote, 
which in the traditional coalition described by Hunter, Jennings and 
Banfield would have supported him, he was unsuccessful in his bid for 
mayor. 
Another factor that helped break up the traditional coalition was 
the actual voter turnout itself. In the initial election held on October 
7, it was estimated that approximately 51 per cent of the registered 
blacks and 43 per cent of the registered whites voted.23 In the runoff 
the increase in these figures was partly due to the Chamber of Commerce 
2^Rooks, The Atlanta Elections, p. 9. 
22Ibid., p. 12. 
23Ibid.. p. 27. 
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backed Operation Vote which some observers interpreted as a call for a 
larger white vote. The white vote did increase to 64,393 or 49.3 per 
cent of the registered voters and the black vote increased to 49,528 or 
56.9 per cent of the black voters.2** Thus, the slightly higher white 
increase in voter turnout benefited the establishment's candidate. 
It is interesting to note that the northside which voted heavily 
for Cook, was the main source of black vice-mayoral candidate Maynard 
Jackson's white strength. Unlike Tate, who received approximately 50 
per cent of the black vote and 2 per cent of the white vote in the 
October 7 election, Jackson in the same election received almost total 
support of the black community or 97.8 per cent and 27.7 per cent of the 
white community. In fact Jackson ran better than Massell on the north- 
side in both elections.2^ His vote in the white community generally 
followed the same direction as Cook's. Former Mayor Ivan Allen inter¬ 
preted this to mean that "even the white business community had agreed 
that it was time to acknowledge the Negroes' growing influence in 
Atlanta."27 
With a final total vote of 55 per cent for Massell and 45 per cent 
24|3acote, Personal computations for the October 21 election. 
25For example in the northside 8th ward, with 24,740 registered 
white voters and only 199 registered black voters, Jackson in the October 
7 election received 4,231 votes, Massell 3»002 votes and Cook 7,260 
votes. See complete Voting Summary-Fulton County, Ga., City-wide 
Election October 7» 1969» p. 3* 
26Rooks, The Atlanta Elections, pp. 36-38. 
27A1 len, Mayor: Notes on the Sixties, p. 234. 
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for Cook, the old coalition was obviously at an end. A period of rapid 
change, with many conflicting ideas, strategies and ideologies, lies 
behind this final vote count. The following analysis of the black press 
coverage of this period is an attempt to define some of the significant 
themes in this transitional era in the city's political structure. 
CHAPTER II 
THE BLACK PRESS! INDICATIONS OF CHANGE 
A study of Atlanta's black press in the years 1969 and 1970 reveals 
the presence of many of the above themes in their coverage of the elec¬ 
tions. Some of the issues and confusions involved in what is considered 
by most observers to be a period of rapid change can be defined by tracing 
the events in the black newspapers. Responses to local issues which help 
to determine candidate support as well as the more abstract influences, 
such as those found in the black power movements, are all found to be 
operative in the black press of this period. 
While the black press in Atlanta is not organized on a community 
basis and is addressed to a wider audience than that living in a specific 
area of the metropolis, it nevertheless shares some of the characteristics 
of the community press which Morris Janowitz defined in The Community 
Press in an Urban Study. The black press operates "midway between the 
mass media (the daily press) and informal communications (word of mouth)." 
It is concerned with details of daily existence as well as attempting to 
negate the "individuating tendencies and impersonality of urban exis¬ 
tence."^ There is an underlying concern with the rights and privileges 
of the community with respect to the larger metropolis which, in the black 
^Morris Janowitz, The Community Press in an Urban Metropolis (Glen¬ 
coe, 111.: Glencoe Free Press, 1952). 
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press, takes the form of issues of racial injustice. 
Unlike Janowitz's model, the black press does not shy away from 
controversy or political involvement. From its beginning in 1827, its 
aim was to inform "a people that had little or no way to really get the 
news of the country" to which they belonged. There has always been a 
believability about the Negro edited newspapers, especially concerning 
Negro activities, which the white owned newspapers have not enjoyed. It 
is generally believed that in areas where Negro newspapers are non¬ 
existent, Negroes have fared worse than in the areas where they have 
existed. And, in our own day, the black press had developed into an 
"institution feared by politicians all the way from the president of the 
United States dawn to a city alderman."3 
The three black newspapers in Atlanta, the Atlanta Daily World. 
the Atlanta Inquirer, and the Atlanta Voice can be placed on a continuum 
from conservative to militant in their treatment of the issues. The 
World reflects a more traditional conception of black-white relationships; 
the Inquirer a moderate view with elements of both conservatism and mili¬ 
tancy* and the Voice a new concept of relationships which is both less 
integrationist and more militant and operates within a black power frame 
of reference. Within these three papers* coverage of the election, we 
can see indications of future change as political alliances shift in the 
black community, and a newer, younger group begins to reject the estab¬ 
lished political leadership. 
^Atlanta Daily World (hereafter cited as World), March 16, 1969, 
p. 1 
^Editorial, World. March 18, 1969, p. 6. 
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The Atlanta Daily World, founded in 1929» by William A. Scott is 
the oldest and most conservative of the three black newspapers in the 
city. Although it has as its motto, "An independent newspaper, non¬ 
sectarian and non-partisan, printing news as accurately as possible and 
supporting those things it believes to be in the best interest of its 
readers," we find that since 1952 it has been heavily Republican in 
orientation. The only exception to supporting Republican presidential 
hopefuls was when it withdrew its support from Barry Goldwater when he 
voted against the 1964 civil rights act. In addition, it has frequent 
photographs and articles of Republican activities to the point, some 
observers feel, of an imbalance in coverage. This may in part account 
ji 
for the drop from a circulation of 30,000 in 1966 to 20,000 in 1970. 
The Atlanta Inquirer, published weekly, came into existence in I960 
as a more strident stance growing out of the 1959 Atlanta student sit ins 
which protested hotel and restaurant discrimination against blacks. Con¬ 
sidered the most professional of the three papers, its motto is "on guard 
for human rights 24 hours a day."'* The newspaper has been cited as play¬ 
ing a vital role in the development of black leadership in the city and is 
presently addressed to a middle class audience. 
When the Inquirer's editorial stance mellowed in the 1960s, the 
Atlanta Voice, "a crusading weekly tabloid," was born. Managing editor 
George Coleman has stated that he feels it is the only newspaper in 
William Schemmel, "Black Voices Filling a Void," Atlanta Magazine, 
(May, 1970), 48-52. 
5Ibid. 
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Atlanta, white or black, that is crusading for improvements in the black 
community. It strives to reach a younger and more liberal black reader 
and tries for the story behind the story without resorting to muckraking. 
Since it is more aggressive and militant in tone than either of the other 
two black papers, it has the leanest advertising lineup of the three. Its 
present circulation is approximately 20,000.** 
We have then three newspapers directed to three different audiences, 
committed to expressing their particular orientation on the events as 
they unfold. A11 three papers concurred that the Atlanta elections of 
1969 were extremely important to the black community. Their respective 
treatment of two aspects of the elections, Dr. Horace Tate's unsuccessful 
bid for the mayor's seat, and Vice-Mayor Sam Massell's successful one, 
is indicative of many of the larger, more fundamental issues involved in 
the changing ideological perspectives which broke up the twenty-one year 
policy of coalition politics. The continuum on which the black press 
lined up on these issues is indicative of their positions on most issues 
throughout the campaign and also provides guidelines suggesting future 
stances during the years of the Massel1 administration. 
With the January 1969 announcement by Mayor Allen that he would 
not seek re-election, there was immediate and widespread speculation 
throughout the black press as to whether or not a Negro could be elected 
mayor in 1969. Thaddeus Stokes, city editor of the World, agreed with 
a statement by Mayor Allen that the chances for a Negro being elected 
6Ibid. 
Mr. Stokes cited several requirements 
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mayor this year were "very slim."^ 
for a successful mayoralty campaign. He felt the aspirant needed the 
support of influential political and business leaders, a good political 
organization, and editorial support from a majority of the media. The 
most serious detriment to the chances of a black candidate he identified 
as the probable splitting of the Negro vote with "a big hassle over sup- 
g 
port of the candidate." 
Thus the World, even before a black candidate announced expressed 
ambivalence over whether or not a black man could win. An alternative 
approach it suggested was for a black to seek the office of vice-mayor 
rather than mayor and throw unified support to a white man who would best 
represent their interests.9 Other observers urged that a strong attempt 
be made for the aldermanic and school boards, with a later "graduation" 
10 
to the mayor's seat. 
We can see then in the World's response, an older, more traditional 
view of black-white relationships which encompass some of the basic con¬ 
cepts in the coalition model of Hunter, Jennings and Banfield. The 
World's emphasis was on the need for the support of the influential white 
business and political leaders and white approval through the dominant 
médias. We may also note a self-demeaning kind of mentality in the idea 
of "graduating" to the mayor's seat. "Graduating" could imply an ideo¬ 
logical framework that refuses to challenge the white world with a unified 
^Editorial, World. January 10, 1969, p. 6. 
8 
Editorial, WorId. January 12, 1969, p. 4. 
^Editorial, World, February 5, 1969, p. 6. 
^Editorial, World, April 22, 1969, p. 6. 
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aggressive effort aimed at the top position. 
The Inquirer was also hesitant regarding a black's chances for 
victory and felt a harmful split could waste the black vote if a strong 
black leader ran for office. It feared the split would then serve to 
further the mayoral aspirations of a conservative white candidate." The 
Inquirer supported its position by pointing to the 1969 defeat of Los 
Angeles' black mayoral candidate Thomas Bradley and felt that his defeat 
cast "a shadow over hopes here to elect the city's first Negro mayor. 
In an Inquicer's opinion survey, we see much the same kind of think¬ 
ing that was exhibited in the World. Senator Leroy Johnson was quoted as 
saying that in his opinion it would be even more difficult for a black to 
win here without a broad white base, political experience, national poli¬ 
tical help and white capital. Marvin Arrington, black candidate for city 
alderman, suggested that a strong black candidate would raise white racist 
fears and lend support to a bigot candidate. He advised that the black 
community support "the strongest liberal white candidate with the best 
1 O 
civil rights record and general support of the Negro community." J 
The Voice took a very different position from the World and the 
Inquirer on this question, a position which showed a sensitivity to an 
increased feeling of potential political power. It immediately pointed 
out that things had changed with the great exodus of whites from the 
city to the suburbs. Blacks, it reported, now found themselves in the 
1^Atlanta Inquirer (hereafter cited as Inquirer). May 3» 1969, 
p. 2. 
12 
Inquirer, June 7, 1969, p. 1. 
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majority in the city, but still in the minority in positions which con¬ 
trol the city. As one observer stated, "If the whites don't want this 
town, give us a black mayor, vice mayor, police chief and fire chief, and 
we'll continue to make the city what it should be."'4* It urged that "an 
organized, disciplined, black voters bloc be created to precipitate a 
"political revolution in this country using the ballot."^ 
A more extreme position found in the Voice was that no matter who 
was elected mayor of Atlanta, white or black, he would "be a slave to 
the business interests and racists and narrow-minded bluenoses who con¬ 
trol the guts of Atlanta."^ This kind of position reflected the growing 
ideological gap between the established black leaders and the younger, 
more militant elements, a break which intensified noticeably when Or. 
Horace Tate's candidacy became the issue. 
Related to the question of a black mayoralty candidate was the con¬ 
cern reflected in all three newspapers of the organizational gap left by 
the demise of the Atlanta Negro Voters League. This demise itself sym¬ 
bolized the transitional nature of Atlanta politics in the last decade. 
We recall that in the coalition model of Hunter, Jennings and Banfield, 
this organization was heavily counted upon to deliver votes to the busi¬ 
ness supported candidate. But it last functioned in the 1961 elections 
and then expired, leaving a leadership vacuum that no one or group has 
^Editorial, Atlanta Voice (hereafter cited as Voice), June 14, 
1969, p. 4. 
^Editorial, Voice, April 10, 1969, p. 5. 
^Editorial, Voice, September 14, 1969» p. 5. 
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filled. This, in conjunction with divided leadership in the Negro com¬ 
munity, reinforced what the Voice saw as "intense competitiveness among 
certain existing organizations for a position of primacy."17 
Attempts were made to fill this gap, but the fact that they were 
unsuccessful might further indicate the presence of conflicting ideo¬ 
logies and strategies. Also, it might indicate a growing strength and 
sophistication which refused to accept the dictates of one group. Most 
of the organizational work that was done emphasized voter registration 
drives rather than dictating a choice of candidates. The Martin Luther 
King Commemoration Committee had as its goal to register 25,000 new 
18 
qualified voters. The Lincoln-Douglass Club, the All Citizens Regis¬ 
tration Committee and the local NAACP each sponsored separate drives to 
increase the number of blacks at the polls.^ The Westside Voters League 
conducted rallies, attempted to organize at the precinct level, screened 
candidates and attempted, not very successfully, to come up with a recom¬ 
mended slate.Fifty persons selected by voters in various precincts 
organized and tried to revive the Atlanta Negro Voters League, but this 
attempt never became a reality. 
Another organization, the Youth Campaign for Voter Registration and 
Education, called upon students to aid in a registration drive. It would 
17yoice, September 21, 1969, p. 1. 
l8World. March 25, 1969, p. 1. 
l^WorId, July 18, 1969, p. 6. 
^^or Id, October 3, 1969, p. 1. 
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not only benefit the community, it was felt, but also would be a learn¬ 
ing experience for the students in the areas of government structure and 
politics. Their goals were to increase the number of registered voters 
in the Atlanta area, to make citizens and students more aware of the power 
of the vote, and to educate the black citizens about the voting process, 
i.e., the acts involved in voting from the time of registration till con¬ 
frontation with the actual voting machine.^1 Significantly enough, this 
group's activities were reported by the Voice, and we notice again an 
emphasis on education so that the people could intelligently exercise 
their growing political strength, not only in this election, but in future 
ones as well. 
The organizational work in the voter registration drives did result 
in getting out a large black vote. Although it was not aimed at dictating 
a particular choice for any specific office, the voters did seem unanimous 
in the case of Maynard Jackson's bid for vice mayor. The final black vote 
for him in the October 7 election represented 97.8 per cent of the black 
voters. However, when his candidacy was announced, issues later expressed 
in response to Dr. Tate's candidacy, first made their appearance through¬ 
out the black press. The World greeted his candidacy on a cautionary note 
that expressed hesitancy, conservatism and fear. It immediately pointed 
out that Jackson should have had a consensus of Negro opinion before 
announcing and that his bid would "have the effect of uniting the segre¬ 
gation forces behind candidates for both mayor and vice-mayor." It would 
also have the long range effect of diluting Negro political influence by 
21 Voice, June 22, 1969, p. 4. 
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lending support to the proposed bill for consolidating Fulton County 
and Atlanta.22 
This kind of negativism continued in the World, interspersed with 
acknowledgement of Attorney Jackson's excellent qualifications. Even at 
the very end, just two days before the primary, the World did not come 
out with a strong, unequivocal endorsement of Jackson. Rather, its 
official position was: 
In the contest for vice-mayor there are two major candidates 
—Alderman Milton Farris and young Attorney Maynard Jackson. 
Alderman Farris offers many years of experience in government. 
Our readers know both these men by their records and should 
make the proper decision.23 
The Inquirer supported Maynard Jackson, and was consistently posi¬ 
tive in its coverage of his candidacy. But it was in the Voice where 
enthusiasm really abounded. On October 4, 1969, the Voice published a 
special two page edition of their newspaper entitled a "Jackson Journal." 
It was devoted to stories relevant to his candidacy and what his success 
would mean for the city of Atlanta. It ran such headlines as "Action 
for Atlanta's People," and "New Idea for a New Atlanta" and emphasized 
his availability for communication with his constituents should he get 
24 
get into office. 
Some of the divisions within the Negro community, then, were 
partially outlined when Dr. Horace E. Tate, the first Negro in modern 
times to seek the position of mayor, announced his candidacy for mayor of 
Atlanta. At this time, Dr. Tate was well known throughout the community 
^Editorial, World. March 9, 1969, p. 4. 
23 
Editorial, World. October 5, 1969, p. 4. 
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in his capacity as executive secretary of the Georgia Teachers and Edu¬ 
cational Association, a post he had held for eight years. When he 
announced his candidacy, he attempted to touch a chord of unanimity by 
stating that he had conferred with State Senator Leroy Johnson before 
reaching his decision and that they were in agreement on his decision to 
run for office. 
Senator Johnson's support was considered by most observers to be 
extremely important. He has been called by some “the single most power¬ 
ful black politician in Dixie" and in his influence and importance stands 
one head higher than such respected leaders as Julian Bond, Ralph Abernathy, 
Charles Evers and Coretta Scott King. There is a general feeling that he 
had an uncanny ability to deliver huge blocs of votes to candidates of 
his choice. He supported Jackson's candidacy on the basis of his quali¬ 
fications as well as the belief that whites would feel relatively com¬ 
fortable with a black in the number 2 position. And, further, that there 
was no possible white-black coalition that would elect blacks as both mayor 
and vice-mayor 
Considering Senator Johnson's sphere of influence then, it was very 
detrimental to Dr. Tate's candidacy when he expressed surprise and dis¬ 
favor over his announcement. Senator Johnson implied that they had made 
an agreement that Dr. Tate would not announce his candidacy until a later 
time and that he had "jumped the gun in making his announcement." 
The World's attitude towards Dr. Tate vacillated throughout the 
^Stephan Lisher, "Leroy Johnson Outslicks Mr. Charlie," New York 
Times Magazine, (November 8, 1970), 35-54. 
^Editorial, World, April 25, 1969, p. 6. 
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campaign. Its initial position echoed the establishment's dictum that 
a black couldn't win in 1969. However, at one point, it reported that 
the Tate campaign had built up such momentum that only a draft of Mayor 
Allen for another term would stop him. On another occasion it stated 
that Tate and the other twenty-three announced Negro candidates could be 
elected if "the so-called Negro leaders would not sell out Negro voters 
28 for their own ill gotten gains." At the same time, it repeatedly wrote 
of his "inelectability," although two days before the primary they reported 
Tate running a strong third with Cook and Massell still fighting for the 
lead.29 
It is interesting to note that when Dr. Tate received only 50 per 
cent of the black vote in the primary, Thaddeus Stokes of the World accused 
the power structure of defeating him. He stated that they had under¬ 
estimated "Tate's pulling power" and but for their theme that "no black 
30 man could win" Dr. Tate could have definitely made the runoff. But we 
may recall that even before Dr. Tate announced his candidacy, Mr. Stokes 
stated that the next mayor would "most likely be white.Also he pub¬ 
licized in his editorials the support of a white man for mayor and a black 
for vice mayor.^ 
^Editorial, World. May 30, 1969, p. 4. 
^Editorial, World, August 8, 1969, p. 6. 
^Editorials, World, September 26, 1969, p. 1, and October 3, 
1969, p. 1. 
^Editorial, World, October 16, 1969, p. 4. 
31 
Editorial, World, January 12, 1969, p. 4. 
32 
Editorial, World, March 6, 1969, p. 6 
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When discussing the World's position of Dr. Tate, we must keep in 
mind that the paper, unlike the Inquirer and Voice, did not take a con¬ 
sistent stand on the candidates. The majority of the World's editorial 
opinions supported a Massel1-Jackson ticket in both the primary and run¬ 
off. But the official editorial position of the paper was an endorsement 
of Rodney Cook, a moderate Republican and the white establishment's candi¬ 
date. And we have already observed the World's non-commital attitude 
regarding Attorney Jackson vs. Milton Farris for vice-mayor. These vari¬ 
ous cross-currents in the World are to some extent a microcosm of the 
shifting patterns with the community as a whole. 
The Inquirer's position on Dr. Tate's candidacy was summed up in 
its final endorsements before the primary. Its recommended slate was Sam 
Massel1 for mayor and Maynard Jackson for vice-mayor, with special recogni¬ 
tion that Dr. Tate's bid was important. It justified its stand on the 
basis of four voter polls conducted over a period of several months which 
indicated to them Dr. Tate's inelectabi1ity. It found that while Massel1 
and Tate shared the bulk of the black vote, Massel1 was preferred by 50 per 
cent to Dr. Tate's 40 percent, and further, that Dr. Tate was receiving 
less than 1 per cent of the white vote. It also contacted experts who 
expressed the opinion that Dr. Tate's chances ranged from very slim to 
absolutely no chance of winning at all. The Inqui rer did see his bid as 
important, however, not only for its symbolic value, but because it 
focused "on the disappointment of black citizens in many white elected 
officials."33 
33 Editorial, Inquirer. October 4, 1969, p. 2 
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It was the Voice, the only newspaper which endorsed Dr. Tate, 
that reacted most intensely to his campaign and defeat. Its interpre¬ 
tation of the Negro leaders' behavior was decisively militant in both 
rhetoric and ideology. Senator Leroy Johnson's actions, in particular, 
were termed "disgusting" and were interpreted as a bid for attention at 
Dr. Tate's expense, and a device to play on white voters' fears of the 
possibility of three Negro candidates. One writer, in a poetic frame, 
stated the problem in verse: 
Selfishness cheats the black man's dream. 
Selfishness crowds the mayor's stream. 
Selfishness is one man to cream; 
Use race for fame, not people 
That's what selfishness is.34 
The Voice talked about "cleaning house" of all the "two faced 
uncle toms" and accused the black and white influential of making a 
deal to permit a black vice mayor if the blacks would cooperate this "last 
time" and push a Sam Massell or a Rodney Cook "into the driver's seat."35 
The Voice specifically questioned the efficacy of the traditional 
Atlanta coalition of the business led whites and the Negro bloc vote. 
It challenged the concept that the black vote supporting a liberal white 
was in any way beneficial for the black community. Rather, it felt it 
was the black politicians, claiming to speak for the community, who were 
the main recipients of the benefits of the victory. They stood "as a 
bridge between the white leader and the black voter" and, as a consequence, 
the leader refused to deal with the black people at all, and would nego¬ 
tiate only with the "established Negro leaders." Dr. Tate's support, 
34 
Editorial, Voice, May 11, 1969, p. 4. 
^Editorial, Voice, September 14, 1969, p. 4. 
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then, was interpreted by the Voice as coming from the little man as "a 
huge rebuff against the continued promises with very few results."3^ 
And, it felt, there was only one basic reason why his support was not 
unanimous and that was that he didn't request the black power structure's 
37 permission to run. 
Pointing to the clear divisions which were now obvious in the black 
community, the Voice identified the Tate supporters as the "Underground," 
which was in direct conflict with the "enemies" who were identified as 
Sam Williams, Jesse Hill, Ben Brown, Martin Luther King, Sr., the Rever¬ 
end J. D. Grier and Senator Leroy Johnson. The "Underground" accused 
these "former liberation fighters of having bought and sold the black 
community for dollars." The enemies exhibited "folly" by waiting until 
the last minute to endorse the white candidates. This confused every¬ 
one and did not allow time for rebuttal, discussion and debate. They 
were "naive" in thinking that blatant lies would be believed by the black 
community, such as reports that Julian Bond was endorsing Sam Massell 
rather than Dr. Tate. Their actions were "ignorant" in that they showed 
no awareness of the black power-black consciousness movement and totally 
ignored the symbolic meaning of Tate's candidacy. And they were "arro¬ 
gant," not only in expressing the belief that no Negro could be elected, 
but in specifically "going before white-press and white-racists" and 
stating as a categorical imperative that "Brother Tate could not get 
in."38 
36Ed itorial, Voice. October 5, 1969, p. 4. 
^Editorial, Voice. October 12, 1969, p. 4. 
38 
Editorial, Voice, October 12, 1969, p. 5. 
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In summary then, we see a continuum in ideological orientation in 
the reaction to Dr. Tate's candidacy. The World, itself representing 
various conflicting positions, seemed increasingly out of touch with the 
newer, more aggressive black power themes and attitudes. The Inquirer. 
somewhat more in touch with the contemporary currents, seemed to want to 
support Dr. Tate if it could have found a realistic base for his elect- 
ability. It seemed to put forth a realistic evaluation of the specific 
election over ideological involvement. The Voice, with its strong aware¬ 
ness of a black consciousness, black power orientation, seemed to indi¬ 
cate that ideology at this stage was more important than a specific defeat 
and that, in the long run, a united stand which said "we will take control 
if we can at the first possible moment" was more important. 
CHAPTER III 
THE NEW ORDER BEGINS 
It was against this background of division and ambivalence in the 
Negro community that Sam Massell, a liberal Democrat, made his success¬ 
ful bid for mayor. When he announced his candidacy, Vice-Mayor Massell 
had been in Atlanta public life for sixteen years, most recently as 
vice-mayor under the Ivan Allen administration and for eight years 
before that on the city executive committee under the William B. 
Hartsfield administration.' In 1964 he was characterized by one obser¬ 
ver as "a hard-working, civic-minded, young Jewish real estate man who 
was thought of as a possible successor to Mayor Allen. Although he was 
O 
not wealthy, this man spent 90 per cent of his time on public business." 
It was fairly obvious, as one writer noted, that Massell's support 
would come from "white liberals, Negro Democrats and Jews...and very 
little, if any, from the 'Establishment.'"3 A consistent theme through¬ 
out his campaign was that he was the "people's candidate...appealing to 
/f. 
all segments of the community." When he invited the public to the 
'World. February 7» 1969, p. 1. 
^Banfield, Big City Politics, p. 28. 
3Ed itorial, World. October 5, 1969, p. 4. 
**WorId, January 8, 1970, p. 4. 
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opening of his campaign headquarters, he promised that there would be no 
speeches and no bands. Rather, it would be a meeting where he could 
"listen to people and talk to people." On another occasion he stated, 
My campaign strategy, if you want to call it that, is 
to continue to do what I've been doing for the past 
eight years as Vice Mayor, and that is to talk to 
people and listen to people.5 
His final plea for votes stated, "Vote for a man who cares about 
people."^ 
The World's position in the runoff was that since there was no 
racial issue between the two candidates, there was no need for a "racial 
bloc vote." It saw both candidates as "progressive-minded young men," 
and believed that there would be a "normal division of the votes in this 
runoff.This was hopeful thinking on the part of the World because 
most observers agreed that Rodney Cook's job in the runoff was to try 
g 
"to block Massell from making more inroads into the Negro community. 
The Inquirer took the position in both the primary and runoff that 
Massell was the only possible choice. It didn't support Dr. Tate in the 
primary because of his unelectabi1ity and saw Rodney Cook as a man "who 
makes promises and much conversation, but when the crucial vote comes, 
Mr. Cook is on the opposite side of black legislators." In its endorse¬ 
ment of Massell they pointed to his long voting record of working for 
civil rights and the "general uplift" of the Negro community and felt 
^WorId, July 29, 1969, p. 1. 
^Advertisement, World, October 5, 1969, p. 11. 
^Editorial, World. October 10, 1969, p. 6. 
^Editorial, WorId, October 16, 1969, p. 4. 
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that he had an excellent chance of being elected.9 The Voice's position 
on the runoff seemed purposely low keyed. Once Tate was defeated, it 
seemed reluctant to come out for any other candidate. Not until Mayor 
Ivan Allen accused Massell of improper conduct did it take a stand sup¬ 
porting him. 
The last minute bid by Mayor Allen to influence the outcome of the 
election by charging Massell with misusing his position as vice-mayor 
brought a unanimously negative reaction from the black press. It 
immediately interpreted the statement as an anti-semitic, anti-black 
smear. The World led the outcry over what it considered to be a smear 
tactic which had not only hurt Cook's bid, but had also injected reli¬ 
gious prejudice into the campaign. It felt that in his statement the 
"Negro and Jew antithesis reared its ugly head along with other deep- 
seated prejudices" and that, as a consequence, Massell received "sympa¬ 
thy support." The feeling was that even though Cook was well known and 
liked that Massell had stronger ties with the Negro voter "than is under¬ 
stood by Cook or white affluent voters."^® 
The Inguirer also interpreted Allen's statement as "an open dis¬ 
cussion of anti-semitism," something it had anticipated would prob¬ 
ably enter the race in some form. The voters, it felt, had interpreted 
the entire incident as revealing signs of a credibility gap in the city 
leadership. Some of the questions that the smear tactic raised were 
why charges were withheld until right before the election; why the 
^Editorial, Inguirer. October 4, 1969, p. 2. 
'^Editorial, World. October 28, 1969, p. 6. 
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candidate was asked to resign and not the policeman involved in the 
charge; whether Mayor Allen's entire voters' drive was intended to stop 
Masse 11 and a black candidate and whether, indeed, the City was offering 
one face to the nation and another to its own people.'* One observer 
attempted an answer with a question of his own. "Is it because he (Massell) 
is a Jew?"*2 
On the eve of the runoff, the Voice gave a rather vague endorsement 
to Massell with the admonishment that all endorsements probably belonged 
"in hen houses." Rather than a "love endorsement," it implied that it 
was a protest "against the bigotry that had been perpetrated upon the 
Atlanta people." It interpreted Massell's coming victory as "the march 
of progress by minorities" which would be a lesson to the "white anti- 
Negro, anti-Jewish rule" that would shake the city for generations to 
come. "The white Protestant following of any 'anti-scream' of the blonde 
13 
leaders" it saw as now dead in Atlanta. J 
Following Massell's victory, the Voice felt that in the poor neigh¬ 
borhoods, and especially the black, an air of protest "against all forces 
of discrimination" seemed to prevail.**1. And it repeated a theme expres¬ 
sed by the World: "Negroes even in anger have learned they have much 
less to fear from a Jew than a Gentile."'^ it warned that the "evidence 
"Editorial, Inquirer. October 25» 1969, p. 1. 
1 2 
Editorial, Inquirer. October 25, 1969, p. 2. 
*3voice. October 26, 1969, p. 1. 
14 Ibid.. 
'^Editorial, Voice. October 26, 1969, p. 4. 
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of black power" exhibited in this election would be fought against and 
that the return of closeness between the black-Jewish vote would wake 
up those segregationists who did not heed the harsh call of Mayor Allen.^ 
One observer saw in the election the voters' expression of opposi¬ 
tion to having decisions made for them by anyone else. We have already 
seen the organization which had in the past told the Negro who to vote 
for, was not able to return to its former position of influence. Now, 
we see this theme repeated in the last upsurge for Massell. It was, 
in this observer's estimation, a vote "against the notion of being told 
by the mayor, the papers or anybody else that voters were not able to 
judge for themselves the issues of honesty and integrity." 
There was too much paternalism about it. The Great 
White Fathers had decided to protect the People from 
any possibility of choosing wrong. The People rose 
up and asserted their right to make their own decisions, 
including their own mistakes--if that is what their 
decisions should turn out to be.^7 
Another theme the same observer noted was the amount of negative 
voting, the "voting against more than voting for." A vote for Cook often 
was a vote against the black establishment; "a vote for Massell in many 
instances was a vote against the white establishment." And, as a result, 
the white establishment--"the residents of the Waspnest northside"-- 
might in the future find itself feeling "like a minority," when faced 
with the new realities that "other peoples ways of doing things, even 
18 of governing a city, might be as good as theirs." 
There were many bitter feelings between the business community 
^Editorial, Voice, November 2, 1969, p. 4. 
^ A/oice, November 2, 1969, p. 1. 
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and the new administration in the aftermath of the election. Mayor 
Allen expressed his discouragement with the results and stated after¬ 
wards, "I don't know what to expect."^9 The former influentials were 
now silent. Massell and Jackson were not members of the old circle of 
closely knit friends and business associates and the previous "informal 
cordiality" was now missing. As one observer noted, "Allen and most of 
the chamber officials were natural friends. Massell knows the leaders, 
but didn't grow up with them or associate with them as intimately as an 
adult as did Allen."2® 
In contrast, the black press unanimously heralded it as a new 
day for blacks and for all Atlantans. The World reported that "he 
surprised some political observers and gave long awaited hope to others 
when he said 'much of the discrimination exercised against blacks will be 
eliminated during this administration.'" He also stated that the debt 
he was paying to Negroes was not "a debt resulting from his election 
r% i 
(but was) a debt dating back over 100 years.Most observers agreed 
that "a more clarion call for democracy had never been made."^^ 
The Inquirer also lavished praise on the address, saying never before 
in the history of Atlanta had the inauguration of a mayor and the instal¬ 
lation of his administration attracted such widespread interest as that 
of Mayor-elect Sam Massell." One observer went so far as to call Massell 
19A1 len, Mayor: Notes on the Sixties, p. 241. 
^Atlanta Constitution, June 21, 1971, p. 5* 
2^Editorial, World, January 8, 1970, p. 4. 
22Editoria1, World, January 11, 1970, p. 6. 
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"a mayor in the 'Kennedy Mold' who had earned the support of black voters 
during his eight years as vice mayor."23 And although it was acknowledged 
that blacks were not expecting miracles, there was hope that a new direc¬ 
tion was established of "elevating black people into what has been called 
the 'mainstream.'"2^ 
The Voice reacted favorably to the address, but immediately sounded 
a call for proof, and not just fine phrases. It insisted on "gifts for 
the people instead of promises." Police brutality, discrimination in 
the fire department, taxation of suburban whites, open housing, and urban 
renewal were listed as some of the most immediate concerns. ^ It reported 
that the time had come "to honor the black man as an equal; to demand 
from him what you demand from whites; to give him opportunity that you 
would give whites." Anything less than this, it warned, will force 
Atlanta to become a black controlled city. 
The generally favorable response by the black press to the inaugural 
address and the new administration was just one indication of the kind 
of change that had been wrought in this transitional period. Not only 
had the traditional coalition of the white power structure and black 
voters' bloc disintegrated, but changes were also evident in the black 
community itself. The continuum, within the papers, from conservatism 
to militancy reflected differences in ideological perspective which were 
being expressed within the community. At the most conservative end was 
23 
Editorial, Inquirer, January 3, 1970, p. 3* 
24 
Editorial, Inquirer, December 20, 1969, p. 2. 
^Editorial, Voice. October 12, 1969, p. 1. 
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Editorial, Voice. October 26, 1969, p. 4 
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the World, which showed a view of black-white relationships that seemed 
to have escaped the impact of the civil rights events of the fifties and 
sixties. The Inquirer seemed more in touch with the times and took a 
pragmatic approach to the issues inherent in the situation. In contrast, 
the Voice was most in touch with the contemporary black power, black 
consciousness movement and took a stand which suggested that ideology 
should be given the highest priority at that time. 
There were only two issues on which the three newspapers concurred. 
The first was that the 1969 elections were extremely important, and the 
second was that Mayor Allen's tactic was an anti-semitic, anti-black 
smear. This latter stand may indicate that although the conservative 
and moderate forces could not operate within a black power framework, 
all three forces could in the future unify on the more general issues 
of minority group progress. This, in itself, would imply an ideologi¬ 
cal shift. It would no longer be the downtown business interests that 
make the decisions about the proper scope of government, nor only the 
white people but rather "The People." And the people in this newer con¬ 
text become the minorities who have suffered from past discriminations. 
We can see, therefore, why the Massel1-Jackson victory was such 
an important one for the black voters. The administration represented a 
legitimizing of the blacks' grievances. It was verbally acknowledged 
that the accusations of the people were valid and that there would be 
attempts made to meet their demands. It was also implied in the inaug¬ 
ural address that specific black interests existed, especially in the 
area of unfair city hiring practices, which must be dealt with in a 
37 
special, sometimes extraordinary way, in order to right the balance. 
Future actions of the administration will bring charges of patronage 
from the white constituency and protests of discrimination from the 
blacks. The stated ideals of the administration are to "uplift human 
dignity and to uplift human rights." The promises have been made. 
In the future, the proof must be forthcoming. 
27 Voice. December 28, 1969, p. 4 
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